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Domestic disturbance incidents constitute the largest category
of calls received by police each year.' This is not surprising given
the number of women who are abused by their intimate partners.
Half of all married women will be beaten at least once by their hus-
bands. 2 Many of these women are beaten as frequently as once a
month, once a week, or even daily.3 The U.S. Surgeon General
found that battering of women by husbands, ex-husbands or lovers
"is the single largest cause of injury to women in the United States,"
accounting for one-fifth of all hospital emergency room cases. 4 The
injuries women sustain in these attacks are at least as serious as
those suffered in violent felony crimes. 5 Weapons are used in thirty
percent of all domestic violence incidents.6 Thirty-one percent of
all women murdered in America are killed by their husbands, ex-
husbands, or lovers. 7
Woman abuse profoundly affects children living in the home. It
imperils children psychologically even when they themselves are
* Staff Attorney, National Center on Women and Family Law.
1 CLARE P. CORNELL & ROGER LANGLEY, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES 131 (1985).
2 RICHARD LANGLEY & RICHARD LEVY, WIFE BEATING, THE SILENT CRISIS 12 (1977).
3 ILLINOIS COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, WOMEN ABUSE: FREQUENT AND
SEVERE, (Springfield, IL 1983).
4 Nikki R. Van Hightower & Susan A. McManus, Limits of State Constitutional Guaran-
tees: Lessons from Efforts to Implement Domestic Violence Policies, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 269
(1989).
5 PATSY CLAUS & MICHAEL RANEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: FAMILY VIOLENCE (1984).
6 Id.
7 K. ROSE &J. Goss, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATISTICS
(National Criminal Justice Reference Service 1989).
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never beaten.8 Frequently children are also victims of abuse. Be-
tween fifty-three and seventy percent of men who abuse women also
beat their children, 9 and a significant number sexually abuse the
children, especially daughters.' 0 Many children also suffer serious
injuries as a result of the reckless conduct of their fathers' while
beating their mothers." In families where the mother is beaten,
sixty-two percent of sons over the age of fourteen are injured trying
to protect their mothers.' 2 A son who sees his father beat his
mother is more likely to become a delinquent or a batterer himself
than if his father beat him instead.
13
In most communities police officers may be the only meaningful
contact citizens have with "the law." The evidence suggests, how-
ever, that police are largely indifferent to domestic violence, and
that they attach to it a very low priority.' 4 Throughout the 1970s
and early 1980s, officers believed and were taught that domestic vio-
lence was a private matter, ill suited to public intervention.' 5 Police
depatments also consider domestic violence calls unglamorous,
nonprestigious, and unrewarding. 16 Until recently, police fre-
quently ignored domestic violence calls 17 or purposefully delayed
responding for several hours. 18 Even when they eventually arrived
on the scene, police rarely did anything about domestic violence, 19
and some actually responded by laughing in the woman's face.
20
Other officers talked to the abuser, possibly removing the batterer
8 JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLACKSLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN
AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 121 (1989).
9 Lee H. Bowker et al., On the Relationship Between Wife Beating and Child Abuse in FEMI-
NIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 164 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds. 1988).
10 LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME 51-54 (1984); LEE ANN
HOFF, BATrERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS 240 (1990); MARIA Roy, CHILDREN IN THE
CROSSFIRE 57 (1988).
11 Roy, supra note 10, at 92-93; PETER JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN OF BATrERED WOMEN
27 (1990).
12 Roy, supra note 10, at 92.
13 Testimony of David Adams, Director of EMERGE, before Massachusetts Gender
Bias Committee (1989).
14 GAIL A. GOOKLASIAN, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AGENCIES, ISSUES AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 29 (National Institute of
Justice, May 1986); CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN,
SELF-DEFENSE AND THE LAW 136 (1989); DEL MARTIN, BATrERED WIVES 92 (1981).
15 EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL RESPONSE
31 (1990).
16 MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN
FAMILY 232 (1980).
17 Id.
18 MARTIN, supra note 14, at 92.
19 Id.
20 HOFF, supra note 10, at 102.
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from the home temporarily to cool off.2 ' Some police officers re-
moved the abused woman from "his" home.2 2 Yet, in conformity to
traditional practice, police virtually never arrested the abuser.23 In
rural areas, police who frequently know both parties or at least the
abuser, were even more reluctant to respond in a manner that
would protect the victim.
24
Indeed, those police departments that had policies on handling
domestic calls in the 1970s had a clear non-arrest policy. The Oak-
land Police Department's 1975 Training Bulletin on Techniques of Dis-
pute Intervention explicitly described
[t]he police role in a dispute situation [as] more often that of a media-
tor and peacemaker than enforcer of the law.... [T]he possibility that
... arrest will only aggravate the dispute or create a serious danger for
the arresting officers due to possible efforts to resist arrest... is most
likely when a husband or father is arrested in his home .... Normally,
officers should adhere to the policy that arrests shall be avoided...
but when one of the parties demands arrest, you should attempt to
explain the ramifications of such action (e.g., loss of wages, bail proce-
dures, court appearances) and encourage the parties to reason with
each other.
2 5
Detroit Police CommanderJames Bannon, in his address to the
1975 American Bar Association convention, described the manner
in which his police officers respond to domestic violence calls. Ac-
cording to Bannen, the dispatcher would screen calls from battered
women to respond only to those women who appeared in the most
imminent danger. If the woman had only minor injuries when they
arrived, the police became angry and would not respond quickly the
next time. 26 Women often learned to report that a stranger was at-
tacking them or that their abuser had a gun. While such a desperate
ploy might have worked once for a woman, police simply declared
her not credible if they found no serious injuries. Lacking credibil-
ity, she was deemed unworthy of police protection if she called
again. Police treated poor women and women of color with less
concern than they did middle class and white women, even when
they were severely injured.
27
21 STRAUS, supra note 16, at 233.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 232-33.
24 ShirleyJ. Kuhle, Domestic Violence in Rural America: Problems and Possible Solutions, NE-
BRASKA POLICE OFFICER 44 (1982).
25 MARTIN, supra note 14, at 93-94.
26 LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 208 (1979).
27 SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF
THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 25 (1982).
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Michigan's policy, as taught in its Police Training Academy, di-
rected officers to:
a. Avoid arrest if possible. Appeal to their [complaintant's] vanity.
b. Explain the procedure of obtaining a warrant.
(1) Complainant must sign complaint.
(2) Must appear in court.
(3) Consider loss of time.
(4) Cost of court.
c. State that your only interest is to prevent a breach of the peace.
d. Explain that attitudes usually change by court time.
e. Recommend a postponement.
(1) Court not in session.
(2) No judge available.
f. Don't be too harsh or critical.
28
Michigan's policy also failed to provide for sufficient education.
While almost half of all Michigan police calls are for domestic dis-
turbances, only three to five out of the 240 hours of police recruit
training are devoted to the manner in which police should answer
these calls. 29 Training in other police departments has been simi-
larly inadequate. Prior to 1980, when police academies were still
uncommon, 30 those who received on-the-job training were generally
assigned to those experienced officers who were seen as most suc-
cessful. Unfortunately, these officers were precisely those least
likely to have challenged the standard practices for responding to
domestic violence incidents. 31 Rookies looked up to their exper-
ienced partners and were rewarded for imitating them.
With the advent of police academies, new recruits were trained
by men generally "chosen" as instructors, not because of their aca-
demic ability or interest in teaching, but because of their advancing
age or temporary disability, or because they were on leave or special
duty restriction pending departmental investigation.3 2 New officers
were often trained first and foremost as men, and the ethic of mas-
culinity was seen as being of the utmost importance.33 Seeing any-
thing from a woman's perspective was, if not almost taboo, at least
so completely foreign that it did not happen.
In this light, it is hardly surprising that the police who did re-
spond to domestic violence calls almost always took the man's
28 MARTIN, supra note 14, at 93 (emphasis in original).
29 SCHEChITER, supra note 27, at 161.
30 Id. at 33.
31 Id. at 32.
32 Id. at 33.
33 R. N. HARRIS, THE POLICE ACADEMY: AN INSIDE VIEW 291 (1973).
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side. 34 And because abusers, when they did not or could not deny
their abuse, tried to shift the blame onto others, especially their vic-
tims, 3 5 the police frequently joined in blaming the victim. 3 6 The re-
sponding officer often admonished the woman to be a better wife or
asked, or at least wondered, why she did not leave.37 Some officers
concluded that she must enjoy the beatings, or at least not mind
them.38 These officers conveniently ignored the fact that their fail-
ure to protect the woman, her lack of money, and the far greater risk
of being beaten or killed if she tried to separate herself from her
abuser 39 all combined to make her decision logical. Women's fears
of retaliation for leaving are rational; divorced and separated wo-
men, who comprise only ten percent of all women, account for fully
seventy-five percent of all battered women, and they report being
battered fourteen times more often than do women still living with
their partners.
40
Battered women who reported assaults have typically repre-
sented a small portion of the total number of victims. 41 One 1970s
study of 109 battered women revealed that of every 32,000 assaults,
only 517, or less than two percent of the total, were actually re-
ported.42 Victims sadly learned that reporting spouse abuse was
futile.
4 3
In 1970, American law did not recognize marital rape as a
crime.44 Though twelve percent of married women are raped by
their husbands, and from thirty-four to fifty-nine percent of battered
women report that their male partner rapes them,45 laws in most
states continued to define rape as intercourse with a woman other
than the rapist's wife.46 Marital rape is one of the strongest
34 SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 25, 158.
35 David Adams, Idenifying the Assaultive Husband in Court: You Be the Judge, BOSTON B.
J., 23, 24 (July-Aug. 1989).
36 SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 25.
37 Id. at 58.
38 Id.; Ruth Grundle, Civil Liability for Police Failure to Arrest: Neering v. Weaver, 9
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 259, 260 (1986).
39 MILDRED D. PAGELOW, FAMILY VIOLENCE 43 (1984).
40 CAROLINE W. HARLOW, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT'CRIME 5 (Bureau of Justice
Statistics Jan. 1991).
41 RICHARD J. GELLES & CLAIRE P. CORNELL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES 21
(1985).
42 R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSEL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES 164 (1979).
43 SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 26.
44 MARTIN, supra note 14, at 89.
45 WALKER, supra note 10, at 48-49; ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL
95-96 (1987).
46 SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 73 (1987).
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predictors of whether one of the spouses will kill the other.47 The
injuries that wives receive from marital rape are more severe than
those received from rape at the hands of a stranger,48 yet if a wife
was raped by her husband before 1970, the strongest charges she
could bring were assault charges or a divorce on cruelty grounds.
In states like New York, where adultery was the only ground for di-
vorce until 1966,49 the wife could not get a divorce regardless of
how many times or how brutally her husband had raped her. Fol-
lowing the law, police throughout the United States largely ignored
marital rape.
In 1981, the supreme courts of Massachusetts 50 and New
Jersey5t declared that a husband could be criminally liable for rap-
ing his wife. Several years later, New York,52 Florida, 53 and Geor-
gia 54 followed suit. As of January 1985, twenty states permitted a
wife to prosecute her husband for rape, although most of these
states limited the situations in which she could do so.55 Even as re-
cently as July 1991, only nineteen states had completely abolished
the marital rape exemption.56 In those states where marital rape
was not a crime, however, it was usually grounds for divorce.57 Fur-
thermore, at least twenty-eight states currently specifically allow sex-
ual abuse of a spouse as grounds for the issuance of an order for
protection. 58 These changes in the law have made police more able
and willing to intervene in situations involving marital rape.
Police frequently rationalized their refusal to intervene in do-
mestic violence cases on the ground that domestic violence work
was highly dangerous. 59 Restoring peace while maintaining control
47 BROWNE, supra note 45, at 95-96; DIANE E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE XXViii
(1990).
48 RUSSELL, supra note 47, at 190-205.
49 MARTIN, supra note 14, at 166.
50 Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (1981).
51 State v. Smith, 85 NJ. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
52 People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2029 (1985).
53 State v. Rider. 449 So. 2d 903 (Fla. App. 1984).
54 Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1985).
55 DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES 140
(1985).
56 NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, MARTIAL RAPE PACKET (799 Broad-
way, Room 402, New York, NY 10003, 1991).
57 For example, Massachusetts and New York before their courts held that marital
rape was a crime.
58 PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT
COURT PRACTICE AND ENFORCEMENT 12-13 (March 1990).
59 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 15, at 32.
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was seen as the best way to minimize the risk to the responding of-
ficer with an emphasis on maintaining control.
Arrests were actively discouraged as a waste of time except when disre-
spect or threats by an offender or victim indicated that the officer
might lose control of the situation. Arrest is therefore [the] assertion
of authority rather than a response to the demands of the situation.
60
The reality, however, is that domestic disturbance incidents,
which account for thirty percent of police calls, account for only
5.7% of police deaths, making domestic disturbances one of the
least dangerous of all police activities. 61 In addition, training police
to better handle domestic violence incidents can reduce assaults
against officers. 62 Nevertheless, the myth that domestic violence
work is dangerous is still used to justify police discrimination against
battered women. 6
3
Another factor makes police education and training difficult.
Beyond dismissing woman battering as a real crime, far too many
police officers either engage in it themselves 64 or tolerate it within
their ranks.65 Like the general population, policemen are often so-
cialized to regard women as inferior and subordinate. 66 Even now,
advocates of battered women know that a policeman's battered wife
is their most difficult case since most other officers will fail to pro-
tect her or enforce any protective order that she may have obtained,
and many will help trace her to any shelter where she has sought
refuge. 6
7
In addition to police indifference, battered women faced a
harsh body of civil law. Prior to 1972, the only civil remedy which a
battered woman had was an injunction against her abuser pursuant
to a divorce or a legal separation. 68 These injunctions were quite
limited. First, in order to even file such an action, a battered woman
had to be married to her abuser.69 Second, the injunctions were
60 Id. at 33.
61 Joel Gardner & Elizabeth Clemmer, Danger to Police in Domestic Disturbances-A New
Look, RESEARCH IN BRIEF, 5 (National Institute ofJustice, Nov. 1986).
62 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 15, at 108.
63 The author has personal experience interviewing women at shelters in Boston and
New York City from 1976 to the present.
64 WALKER, supra note 10, at 207.
65 GILLESPIE, supra note 14, at 13, 15.
66 James Bannon, Law Enforcement Problems With Intra-Family Violence, a study
presented to the A.B.A. Convention (Aug. 12, 1974) (available from Americah Friends
Service Committee, Women's Issues Program, Cambridge, MA).
67 Interview with Judith Armatta, General Counsel, Oregon Coalition Against Do-
mestic and Sexual Violence (Dec. 3, 1991).
68 FINN & COLSON, supra note note 58, at 2; SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 162; Lisa G.
Lerman, State Legislation on Domestic Violence, 3 RESPONSE No.12, 2 (Aug./Sept. 1980).
69 Lerman, supra note 68, at 2.
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available in only some states. 70 Third, most injunctions expired au-
tomatically by law within a fairly short time or when the court con-
cluded the case. 7' Finally, there was no criminal penalty for
violating such an injunction.72 The woman had to resort to filing a
contempt action against her husband to bring criminal enforce-
ment.7 3 Such actions usually required a new petition and another
filing fee, with another order for her husband to appear in court and
further costs to have him served.74 Even then, the woman had little
hope that the man would get more than an admonishment from the
judge.75 There was also always the chance that the contempt hear-
ing would be turned against her, and the judge would examine her
behavior to see what she had done to upset the husband, or what
new court order would make him feel less aggrieved and therefore
less likely to abuse her in the future.76 One. thing, however, was
certain; police were seen as having no role in enforcing these injunc-
tions since the injunctions were purely civil matters.
II. COURT CHALLENGES
In the 1970s, Americans gradually became aware that millions
of women were being brutally abused by their husbands. A few wo-
men had started organizing around the issue of battered women.
Some opened their homes to victims or started shelters. Others
proposed legislation to assist battered women. It was clear, how-
ever, that neither of these approaches would have much effect if the
police did not enforce the new laws. As women increasing frus-
trated by the failure of police to arrest even husbands who commit-
ted even felony assaults, it became clear that they needed to
concentrate their efforts on forcing the police to enforce the few
laws that did exist to help battered women.
77
In 1972, the executor of Ruth Bunnell's estate filed a wrongful
death action against the San Jose Police Department.78 Mrs. Bun-
nell had called the police at least twenty times in the year before her
70 As of 1980, these were still the only type of protection in the states of Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
71 Id
72 FINN & COLSON, supra note 58, at 2.
73 LISA LERMAN, CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, COURT DECISIONS ON WIFE
ABUSE LAWS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (1982).
74 MARTIN, supra note 14, at 58.
75 LERMAN, supra note 73, at 1.
76 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT,
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETrS 52 (1989).
77 SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 159.
78 Hartzler v. City of San Jose, 46 Cal. App. 3d 6, 120 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1975).
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death to complain that her husband was abusing both her and her
two daughters. 79 Only once did they arrest her husband. 80 In Sep-
tember of 1972, she called the police for help, telling them that her
husband was on his way to the house to kill her.8' They told her to
wait until he arrived. 82 By the time police came in response to a
neighbor's call, her husband had stabbed her to death.83 The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of the
case, reasoning that the police had never "induced decedent's reli-
ance on a promise, express or implied, that they would provide her
with protection." 84
Legal aid and legal service lawyers, who had always known that
the vast majority of their female divorce clients were being violently
abused by their husbands,85 were experiencing the same frustra-
tions. Fearing that another tort action for damages against the po-
lice would probably meet with little sucess, two groups of legal
services lawyers on opposite shores of the country decided to adopt
a different approach. They filed for declaratory and injunctive relief
against the police in order to force them to do what the law empow-
ered them to do to protect battered women.
The first to file suit was a group of five attorneys in the Legal
Aid Society of Alameda County in Oakland.8 6 They filed a com-
plaint in October of 1976 in the Northern District of California.87
The suit which was captioned Scott v. Hart, was in the form of a class
action against George T. Hart, Chief of the Oakland Police Depart-
ment. 88 They filed on behalf of "women in general and black wo-
men in particular who are victims of domestic violence." 89 All five
of the named plaintiffs were black women who had repeatedly called
the Oakland police for protection when they were beaten up by their
husbands, ex-husbands or boyfriends.90 The officers had either






84 Id.; MARTIN, supra note 14, at 99.
85 SCHECHTER, supra note 27, at 122, 167.
86 These attorneys were Jefferson Patterson, Les A. Hausrath, Miriam Steinbock,
Evelyn R. Sinailco, and Clifford Sweet.
87 Scott v. Hart, No. C-76-2395 (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 28, 1976).
88 Id.
89 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of Manda-
mus 1 (copy on file with author).
90 Id. at 6, 10-14.
91 Id. at 1 1, 3, 6-7, 10-14.
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case, a threatening manner.92 By bringing their suit on behalf of
black victims of domestic violence who were getting less adequate
police responses than were white victims, the legal aid lawyers were
able to allege a denial of the equal protection mandated by the
Fourteenth Amendment.93 They also claimed that the police had
breached their duty to arrest the abusers "when a felony [had] been
committed such as felony wife beating" 94 and that a "police policy
that de-emphasizes and discourages arresting assailants ... is arbi-
trary, capricious, discriminatory, and deprives plaintiffs and the
plaintiff class of the right to equal protection of the laws." 95 The
complaint asked the court to: (1) permanently enjoin the police
from refusing to respond adequately to battered women's calls;
(2) affirmatively order the police to respond adequately; (3) order
the police "to arrest when they know that a felony has been commit-
ted or when the woman requests the arrest of the assailant"; (4) or-
der the police to "advise women of their right to make citizens'
arrests and [of the fact] that the police [will] effectuate those arrests
by taking the assailant into custody"; (5) order the police to "take
assailants to a mental facility for 72-hour observation" when appro-
priate; (6) order the police to train officers in "how to best handle
these incidents"; (7) order the police to start a batterer treatment
program; (8) order the city to establish a shelter for women; and
9) force defendants to pay plaintiffs' "court costs, expenditures and
reasonable attorneys fees." 9 6
The first hurdle which plaintiffs needed to overcome was posed
by the Supreme Court's ruling in Rizzo v. Goode.9 7 In that case, the
Court held that supervisory officials must have actual knowledge of
and responsibility for promulgating discriminatory polices before an
aggrieved party could get injunctive relief in federal court.98 This
hurdle, however, proved to be not much of an obstacle in Scott. The
existance within the Oakland Police Department of a clear arrest-
avoidance policy which was known to the watch commanders and
other supervisors persuaded the court to allow the case to survive a
motion to dismiss.99 Not until November 14, 1979, however, more
92 Id. at 16-17.
93 Id. at 10-14.
94 Id. at 15; See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(d) (West 1990).
95 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for a
Writ of Mandamus 25 (copy on file with author).
96 Id. at 9-10.
97 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 364 (1976)
98 Id. at 377.
99 Id.; see Brief of Defendants in Support of Motion for SummaryJudgment andJudg-
ment Dismissal, Scott v. Hart, No. 6-76-2395 (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 23, 1977) passim.
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than three years after the class had filled its complaint, did the par-
ties agree to a settlement.100 The settlement granted most of the
plaintiff's requested relief: the police agreed to a new policy in
which they would respond quickly to domestic violence calls. The
police also agreed to make an arrest whenever an officer had prob-
able cause to believe that a felonious assault had occurred or that a
misdemeanor had been committed in his presence.10' This new pol-
icy required the police to make their arrest decisions without look-
ing to factors traditionally used to justify inaction. 0 2 The police
also agreed not to use the threat of adverse financial consequences
for the couple to justify inaction or to urge the victim not to pursue
the case. The settlement also required police to inform each bat-
tered woman that she had a right to make a citizen's arrest, and re-
quired police to help her to do so.10 3 Officers would thereafter refer
victims to supportive agencies for counseling and other assist-
ance. 10 4 Furthermore, the department acknowledged that it had an
affirmative duty to enforce civil restraining and "kick out" orders.10 5
While Oakland was not required to provide a shelter and counseling
for victims (or assailants), the city agreed to apply for federal fund-
ing for any support services available to battered women, and to pay
the plaintiffs' attorney fees and court costs.
106
The Scott settlement decree could be modified by agreement of
the parties, or by a showing by either party that modification was
necessary "to avoid irreparable injury to a party, or to accommodate
unforeseen or changed circumstances."'' 0 7 The police department
agreed to continue to give the plaintiffs crime and assignment re-
ports and anything else they possessed regarding their response to
domestic violence situations.' 0 8 The court retained jurisdiction of
the case to ensure compliance, and neither party was allowed to ap-
ply to the court for dismissal of the case until at least three years had
passed and further supervision of the case was no longer
necessary. 109
100 Scott v. Hart, No. C-76-2395 (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 28, 1976).
101 Id. at 11 2-8.
102 Those factors included whether or not the victim was married to the alleged assail-
ant, lived with the assailant, had a protective order, had previously sought police help or
was hesitant or unwilling to prosecute, or whether the assailant promised to stop his
abusive behavior. Id. at $ 3d.
103 Id. at 7.
104 Id. at 9b.
105 Id. at 110.
106 Id. at s 13, 15.
107 Id. at 16.
108 Id. at 14.
109 Id. at s 16.
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In December 1976, approximately six weeks after the Scott case
was filed, three New York legal services programs and the Center
for Constitutional Rights filed a similar class action suit on behalf of
married battered women against the New York City Police Depart-
ment and the New York Family Court. In their complaint, captioned
Bruno v. Codd,110 twelve named plaintiffs alleged that the police
failed to arrest husbands who battered their wives and that New
York Family Court personnel denied battered wives access to the
court.111 The complaint, filed in the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, named the New York City Police Department, the Family
Court, the Probation Department, and sixteen others as defend-
ants.1 12 They claimed thirteen causes of action on behalf of bat-
tered wives who had repeatedly been denied police protection or
given endless runarounds. 113 During the pendency of the case, affi-
davits from forty-eight more women were received, supporting all of
the charges.1
14
Thirteen months before the complaint was filed, two New York
lawyers had decided to "institute a lawsuit challenging the legal sys-
tem's treatment of battered wives" there. 11 5 They interviewed nu-
merous battered wives and collected information about the policies
of the New York City Police Department.1 16 The affidavits that they
collected showed a blatant disregard for women's welfare.1 17 The
affidavits also showed that the women were desperate to stop the
abuse, had tried numerous times to do so, and had failed due only
to the system's faults. 1 8 The women explained in their affidavits
the economic and societal pressures that kept them from leaving
their husbands. 119 They outlined the obstacles each encountered,
such as a lack of day care, shelter beds or housing, and increased
violence from their husbands, which, along with the absence of po-
lice protection, combined to prevent them from leaving their hus-
bands. 120 They described how, even when women managed to
110 Complaint, Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
passim.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 9 1-3, 5-12D.
113 Id. at 9 15-31.
114 Affidavits on file with Bruno v. Codd case (copy on file with author).
115 Laurie Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women 5 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7, 15
(1978).
116 Id. at 15, 16.
117 Complaint, supra note 110, at 99 57-59, 342-43, 512.
118 Id. at 99 32-576.




obtain orders of protection, the police refused to enforce them. 121
The Administrative Judge of the Family Court stated to the
Bruno court that he was unaware of the problems described in the
plaintiffs' complaint, and that the Family Court had a right to ad-
dress the changes which the plaintiffs' sought. 122 The Director of
the New York City Probation Department issued an order setting
forth procedures for processing oral or written complaints against
any probation employee who failed to advise women of their right to
reject offers of mediation and instead appear immediately before a
judge on a petition for an order of protection.1 23 In addition, the
legislature amended of the Family Court Act to prohibit officials
from discouraging or preventing anyone wishing to file for a protec-
tive order from having access to the courts for such purposes. 124
Accordingly, the New York Court of Appeals dismissed the causes of
action against the Family Court and Probation Department. 125 Even
in dismissing the causes of action against the Family Court, how-
ever, New York's highest court praised "the welcome efforts of
plaintiff's counsel" to alert and sensitize the courts to their respon-
sibility to respond to the brutality inflict upon battered women.
126
After the Court of Appeals dismissed the counts against the
Family Court and the Probation Department, several counts against
the Police Department remained pending in the trial court. Judge
Gellinoff, the trial judge, was troubled by the allegations supporting
these counts. 127 "For too long," he wrote in denying a motion to
dismiss,
Anglo-American laws treated a man's physical abuse of his wife as dif-
ferent from any other assault and, indeed as an acceptable practice. If
the allegations of the instant complaint - buttressed by hundreds of
pages of affidavits - are true, only the written law has changed; in
reality, wife beating is still condoned, if not approved, by some of
those charged with protecting its victims.
128
The police department, concerned that the ruling on the mo-
tion to dismiss was a precursor of things to come, entered into a
consent judgment with the plaintiffs. The judgment provided that
the police would thenceforth have a duty to respond and would re-
121 Id. at 497-516.
122 See Affidavit ofJoseph B. Williams 10-11 (copies of Bruno v. Codd affidavits on file
with author).
123 N.Y. General Order 5-77.
124 N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT. § 812(3) (1990).
125 Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
126 Id.
127 Complaint, supra note 110, at 32-576.




spond to every woman's request for protection against someone she
alleged to be her husband if she said he was beating her or had vio-
lated an order of protection.' 29 If the officer has reasonable cause
"to believe that a husband has committed a misdemeanor against
his wife or has committed a violation against his wife in the officer's
presence, the officer shall not refrain from making an officer arrest
of the husband without justification."'130 When the officer has rea-
sonable cause to believe that a husband committed a felony against
his wife or violated an order of protection, the officer must arrest
him and should not attempt to reconcile the parties or mediate.' 3 '
When a husband who allegedly committed a crime against her is not
present when the police arrive and the wife wants him arrested or to
make a civilian arrest, the officer must locate the husband just as
with any other crime.' 3 2 Officers must hereafter assist the wife in
obtaining any needed medical assistance, and inform her of her
right to get a protective order from the family court.'33 The police
department must promulgate new policies and training materials in
conformance with the decree, and a supervising officer must
promptly investigate any allegation that a provision of the consent
decree was violated and, if it was, cause it to be immediately com-
plied with as soon as possible.' 3 4 The court retained jurisdiction of
the police action and allowed either party to apply for further relief
as may be necessary or appropriate.
3 5
The Oakland and New York City lawsuits made clear to police
departments throughout the United States that they were vulnerable
to being sued if they failed to protect the rights of battered women.
Battered women's advocates soon learned how many police chiefs
knew that both of the departments had "lost." As a result, police
departments in many towns and cities agreed to revamp their poli-
cies and practices without any suit having to be filed.' 3 6 The possi-
bility that the town or city might be liable for attorney fees and even
for damages in a case by injured women became a persuasive bar-
gaining chip to many battered women's lawyers and advocates.
13 7
129 Consent judgement 4-5 (copy on file with author).
130 Id. at 5.
131 Id at 6.
132 Id. at 8.
133 Id. at 7.
134 Id. at 8.
135 Id. at 10.
136 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 15, at 75. Examples include New Haven, Conn.,
Chicago, Ill., and Atlanta Ga.
137 See, e.g. Lewis v. Dallas, No. CA3-85-0606-T, Slip op. (N.D. Tex. 1985);




The caselaw took one more important step forward in Thurman
v. City of Torrington, Conn.,138 where a federal jury awarded Tracey
Thurman and her son $2.3 million because the police were negli-
gent in failing to protect her from her abusive husband. 139 The
court found that the Torrington's policy of indifference amounted
to sex discrimination.
140
The effect of the case was dramatic. As one commentator
observed,
The Thurman case was widely reported in the popular press and in
academic journals. It graphically confirmed the extreme financial pen-
alty that could be imposed on police departments when they abjectly
fail to perform their duties. In addition, it confirmed that in appropri-
ate cases, these massive liability awards would be upheld. 14 1
Many police departments that did not get the message from Scott
and Bruno were forced by Thurman's threat of huge liability to
change their policies.1
42
III. INCREASING ARREST POWERS
A. ENFORCING PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Although prosecutors, the judiciary, and probation offices must
all play a role in protecting women from abusive partners, it is the
role of the police, who are the first to respond, that usually deter-
mines whether victims ever get to a courthouse. 143 Police are the
actors who must decide whether to arrest the abuser or to tell the
victim about her rights. Without police help, few victims will even
realize what their options are.
Women who have civil protection orders fully believe that the
orders will be enforced.144 The order frequently contains a warning
printed on its face indicating that it is a criminal offense to violate
the order. 45 Court personnel lead victims to believe that the order
will be enforced by the police.' 46 The police themselves, by urging
victims to get civil orders, and by explaining that they cannot do
138 595 F.Supp. 1521 (Dist. Conn. 1984).
139 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 15, at 75.
140 Id. at 74-75.
141 Id. at 75.
142 Dallas, Texas is an example.
143 FINN & COLSON, supra note 58, at 58, 60.
144 The author has personal experience interviewing women at shelters in Boston and
New York City from 1976 to the present.
145 For example, the Massachusetts statutes states "Each abuse prevention order is-
sued shall contain the following statement: VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A
CRIMINAL OFFENSE." MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 209A § 7, 3 (1992).
146 See, e.g., FINN & COLSON, supra note 58, at 52-53.
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anything without such orders, also lead victims to believe that the
orders will be enforced.
1 47
Failure to enforce a protective order "increases the victim's
danger by creating a false sense of security. Offenders may rou-
tinely violate orders, if they believe there is no real risk of being
arrested."' 148 Ultimately, without arrest, domestic violence laws
could be violated with impunity. Yet even a police force willing to
enforce a law is limited by the arrest powers which they have.
B. WARRANTLESS MISDEMEANOR ARREST
Realizing that the Oakland and New York City suits were time-
consuming and that judgments were difficult to enforce, battered
women's advocates soon turned to other approaches to changing
police handling of woman abuse cases. One approach included ef-
forts to get each police department to develop an effective domestic
violence policy. Another centered on getting state legislatures to
change the laws to enable police to arrest woman abusers when re-
sponding to domestic incidents.
At the same time, police organizations, following the success of
the Scott and Bruno cases, were rethinking their policies. In 1980,
the Police Executive Research Forum published Responding to Spouse
Abuse and Wife Beating: A Guide for Police, which informed police that
other police agencies were already "reevaluating their policies, pro-
cedures and training programs in order to improve" how they "han-
dle spouse abuse and wife beating," and which proposed models for
police in making effective changes.
149
Inadequate policies still were in place in most departments.
While officers could arrest when they had probable cause to believe
that a felony offense had been committed, 150 in most, but not all,
jurisdictions police could not make an arrest for a misdemeanor as-
sault unless the assault occured in the police officer's presence.' 5 '
Because most police charge domestic violence offenses only as mis-
demeanors, the law, in order to enable an officer to arrest the abuser
when the offense was not committed in the officer's presence, has to
permit the arrest without a warrant. Changes must be made.
147 Id. at 60.
148 Id. at 49.
149 NANCY LOVING, RESPONDING TO SPOUSE ABUSE AND WIFE BEATING: A GUIDE FOR
POLICE 51 (1980).
150 Lisa Lerman & Franci Livingston, State Legislation on Domestic Violence, 6 RESPONSE,
No. 5, 4 (Sept./Oct. 1983) (available from Center for Women Policy Studies, Wash.,
D.C.).
151 Loving notes that "This requirement is changing in many jurisdictions as a result
of new domestic violence statutes." LOVING, supra note 149, at 100.
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Empirical research on police response to domestic abuse was
beginning to be available. By 1984, the Minneapolis police domes-
tic violence experiment was widely cited as proof that arrests had a
deterrent effect on men who beat their wives.' 5 2 The movement to
expand police arrest powers was already well established by 1984,
however, and it was generally unopposed by police who established
department policies. While many law enforcement officers still did
not want to arrest batterers, they certainly had no objection to being
given the discretion to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests upon
probable cause. Many police chiefs and policymakers who knew that
their departments would be vulnerable to police suits like the ones
in Oakland and New York City sought these changes or instituted
mandatory arrest policies.' 53
Legislative action began somewhat earlier. The enactment of
domestic violence legislation had actually begun in the 1970s. By
1976, the District of Columbia 154 and Pennsylvania 55 had each en-
acted such legislation. 156 In 1978, Pennsylvania amended its do-
mestic violence act to permit warrantless arrests if the officer had
probable cause to believe that a protection order had been vio-
lated. 157 In the eighties, progress continued. By October of 1981,
thirty-six states and the District of Columbia had enacted domestic
violence acts.' 58 By 1983, forty-three states and the District of Co-
lumbia had passed such legislation. 159 Indeed, the only states with-
out domestic violence statutes in September of 1983 were Arkansas,
Idaho, Michigan, New Mexico, South Carolina, Virginia and Wash-
ington. 160 According to two commentators, by that time,
[t]hirty-three states ha[d] expanded police power to arrest in domestic
abuse cases. In twenty-eight states, arrest without a warrant [wa]s per-
mitted where a police officer ha[d] probable cause to believe that an
abuser ha[d] committed a misdemeanor. In nineteen states, police
may arrest without a warrant if they ha[d] probable cause to believe
that an abuser hald] violated a protection order. (Fourteen states al-
low[ed] probable cause arrest in both cases.)161
Furthermore, almost half of the states have now imposed duties on
152 Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis Violence Experiment, 1
POLICE FOUND. REP. 1, 8 (1984).
153 Rye, New York and Newport News, Virginia are examples.
154 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1001-1006 (1991).
155 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10181-10190 (1990).
156 LOVING, supra note 149, at 134-43.
157 Id. at 141; 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10190(C) (1990).
158 Lerman & Livingston, supra note 150, at 1.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 4.
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responding officers to, inter alia, remain with the victim until the
danger passes, transport the victim to a hospital or shelter, or in-
form the victim about her legal rights.
162
In the mid-eighties, the Victim Services Agency, as part of an
effort to encourage police chiefs to adopt effective domestic vio-
lence policies, ran workshops around the country. In September
1988, the agency published a compilation of each state's arrest law
as interpreted by the state's Attorney General. 163 The report
showed that all but two states, Alabama and West Virginia, allowed
misdemeanor arrest. 164 These remain the only states where misde-
meanor arrest is not allowed for offenses committed outside the of-
ficer's presence.
C. MANDATORY ARREST
The Oregon Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence
(hereinafter "OCADSV") took a different approach. It proposed a
bill imposing a mandatory duty on the police.' 65 The bill required
police officers to arrest anyone in a domestic violence incident
whom the officer had probable cause to believe had committed an
assault or had placed a victim with an order of protection in fear of
imminent serious physical injury. This bill was enacted in 1977,166
making Oregon the first state to require police to arrest. 167 A provi-
sion in the Abuse Prevention Act 168 which allowed police not to
arrest when the victim objected 169 was eliminated in 1981170 be-
cause police were using it to circumvent the law. 171
Although the OCADSV sent every police department a detailed
explanation of the new law before it took effect, two years later the
Oregon Governor's Commission on Women found that one third of
all law enforcement agencies had not changed their policies to com-
port with the requirements of the law. 172 One commentator re-
ported that "[o]fficers continued to think of their responsibilities in
domestic disturbance situations as that of mediation and reconcilia-
162 Id.
163 See VICTIM SERVICES AGENCY, THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO FAMILY Vio-
LENCE: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO FAMILY VIOLENCE LEGISLATION (1988).
164 Id.
165 Oregon bill 1977 c. 845.
166 OR. REV. STAT. § 133.055(2) & § 133.310(3) (1989).
167 LERMAN, supra note 73, at 21; Grundle, supra note 38, at 265.
168 Oregon bill 1977 c.845.
169 Oregon bill 1981 c. 818 § 2.
170 Oregon bill 1981 c.780.




tion. Police training had not changed. The police were still in-
structed to respond in terms of 'crisis intervention' rather than
'crime intervention.' "173
In response to police inaction, Henrietta Nearing filed a tort
suit in Oregon State Court against the police in the fall of 1980.174
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant po-
lice, 175 and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed. 176 The Oregon
Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding in Nearing v. Weaver 177
that the police may be held liable for harm resulting from their fail-
ure to enforce a restraining order. 178 The court ruled that police
did not have discretion in enforcing restraining orders issued pursu-
ant to the Abuse Prevention Act.179 The Nearing decision virtually
required every police department in Oregon to adopt a mandatory
arrest policy.' 80
Similar developments occurred elsewhere. By the middle of
1982, the domestic abuse laws of five states mandated that police
arrest batterers upon probable cause to believe that a crime had
been committed or a restraining order violated.' 18 Currently, fif-
teen states require the police to arrest for a domestic violence inci-
dent. 8 2 In addition, nineteen states require police to arrest if the
batterer has violated a protection order. 8 3 Because some police de-
173 Id. at 262.
174 Id. at 263.
175 Nearing v. Weaver, 61 Or. App. 297, 656 P.2d 965, rev'd, 295 Or. 702, 704, 670
P.2d 137, 139 (1983).
176 Id.
177 295 Or. 702, 670 P.2d 137 (1983).
178 Id. at 714, 670 P.2d at 142.
179 Id. at 710, 670 P.2d at 142.
180 Grundle, supra note 38, at 265.
181 LERMAN, supra note 73, at 21.
182 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601B (1991); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 46B-38b(a)
(West 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031(a) (1991); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 709-906(4)
(1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2 (West 1989); ME. REV STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770 (West
1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.085 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137 (1991); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 2C:25-5a (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.055 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-29-3(B)
(1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-3-21 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8(2)
(1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2) (West 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 968.075(2) (West 1990).
183 NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, MANDATORY ARREST PACKET (avail-
able from 799 Broaday, Room 402, New York, NY 10003, 1991). See DEL. CODE ANN tit.
13, § 1510 (1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770 (West 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 209A, § 6 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(14) (West 1991); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 455.085(2) (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-928 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.070
(1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:8 I(a) (1990); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:25-15-1
(1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(c) (Michie 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4 (1991);
OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-29-3(B) (1991); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. § 23A-3-2.1 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611(a) (1991); TEX. CRIM.
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partments have punitively arrested both parties in an attempt to cir-
cumvent the intent of mandatory arrest laws,18 4 eight states have
enacted language directing the police to arrest only the primary
physical aggressor or the party not responding in self-defense.18 5
Finally, one state, Louisiana, has a statute that appears to mandate
arrest when a domestic violence offense has been committed, but it
is not being so interpreted.
18 6
IV. QUESTIONS RAISED ABOUT THE POLICE ARREST EXPERIMENTS
Advocates of battered women have generally presumed that,
until the entire system takes woman abuse seriously, men will go on
abusing women with impunity.'8 7 Advocates were encouraged by
the suggestion of the original arrest experiment in Minneapolis' 8 8
that mandatory arrest alone had a significant deterrent effect on bat-
terers. As more police departments adopted mandatory arrest poli-
cies, however, advocates were struck by the number of departments
that failed to implement the policies.' 8 9 Even when the policies
were implemented, others in the system continued to undermine
the message that domestic violence is a crime not to be tolerated.
Prosecutors who chose not to prosecute, judges who threw the cases
out of court or refused to impose more than token punishment, or
probation officers who never bothered to ensure compliance with
probationary terms all left the batterer with the last laugh. This left
the abuser free to flout to his victim the reality that society allowed
him to beat her, or at least would do nothing effective to intervene.
Six studies were later funded to see whether arrest alone would
have the deterrent affect it had in Minneapolis. 9 0 The results of
PROC. CODE ANN. § 14.03(b) (West 1991); Utah Code Ann., § 30-6-8 (1) (1991); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(B) (West 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.122(10) (West
1990).
184 See, e.g. Steven B. Epstein, the Problem of Dual Arrest in Family Violence Cases,
(Connecticut Coalition Against Domestic Violence Oct. 21, 1987) [unpublished, on file
with author].
185 NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, supra note 183. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3601B (1991); IoWA LEG. SERV., 73rd Gen. Assembly, Regular Session,
House File 2160, § 3A (West 1989); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.085(3) (1990); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 171.137(2) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-29-3(C) (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 23A-3-2.2 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(B) (West 1990); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 968.075(3)(a) (West 1990).
186 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 46 § 2140 (1991).
187 Advocates include the author, Lisa Lerman, Nancy Lemon, and Lisa Frisch.
188 See Sherman & Berk, supra note 152.
189 See e.g. DONALD D. DUTrON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT ON WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND CRIMINALJUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 139, 143-44 (1988); BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note
15, at 44.
190 See Sherman & Berk, supra note 152.
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three of those studies, conducted in Omaha,' 9 ' Charlotte, 19 2 and
Milwaukee, 19 3 indicated that arrest alone did not deter abusers.
19 4
While these three newer studies cast some doubt on whether arrest
alone is an effective deterrent with all abusers, there are a number of
points to consider.
First and most important, even if arrest may not deter unem-
ployed abusers in ghetto neighborhoods, 195 arrest still deters the
vast majority of abusers. 19 6 That a few hours under arrest fails to
deter the abusers who are generally considered to be society's fail-
ures is hardly surprising. In some subcultures of ghettoized people,
where imprisonment is all too common, a few hours in jail may be
seen as only minor irritation, or even a right of passage. 197 We do
not consider eliminating arrest for other crimes (e.g., robbery),
however, because it may not deter a particular individual or class of
individuals. The studies may suggest that to deter more batterers,
the stakes may need to be higher, not lower or nonexistant.
Second, when police arrested the offender, far fewer victims
were beaten at their first subsequent encounter with their abuser. 198
This was true even among those least likely to be deterred in the
long run: in Milwaukee two percent of arrested batterers reas-
saulted as opposed to seven percent of those who received a
warning. 199
Third, the Charlotte experiment found that informing both par-
ties that an arrest warrant would be issued for the abuser was no less
effective than an immediate arrest.20 0 Since only 0.9% of those who
were arrested or for whom citations were issued served prison time
after sentencing, the long period of uncertainty awaiting arrest may
have reinforced the message that abuse is wrong.
20 1
. Fourth, the Milwaukee, Omaha and Charlotte studies did not
take into account how the female victims' responses to the various
191 See Franklyn W. Dunford et al., The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault: the Omaha Police
Experiment, 28 CRIMINOLGY 183 (1990).
192 J. DAVID HIRSCHEL ET AL. CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT REPLICATION PROJECT: FI-
NAL REPORT (Jan. 1991).
193 Lawrence W. Sherman et al., From Initial Deterence to Long-Term Escalation: Short Cus-
tody Arrest for Poverty Ghetto Domestic Violence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 821 (1991).
194 The Omaha study is difficult to analyze because of its lack of explanation as to the
actual police responses.
195 Sherman et al., supra note 193.
196 Id. at 842.
197 HIRSCHEL ET AL., supra note 192.
198 Sherman et al., supra note 193, at 844.
199 Id. at 834.
200 HIRSCHEL ET AL., supra note 192, at 133.
201 Id. at 33, 147.
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police actions may have affected the overall results. In contrast,
other recent research into the effectiveness of batterer treatment
programs has found that fifty-three percent of women plan to recon-
cile with a batterer-in-treatment but that only nineteen percent of
abused victims plan to do so if the batterer is not in treatment.
20 2
Although completing batterer treatment made no difference in stop-
ping future violence or in the seriousness of future attacks by the
abuser, women whose partners were sent to court-ordered treat-
ment were more likely to call police and bring new charges if they
were subsequently assaulted. 20 3 While sending batterers to treat-
ment has no deterrent effect on the batterer 20 4 and may actually
deceive many victims into reconciling with their abuser on the as-
sumption that treatment must be effective, the victim is more likely
to use that system in the future, knowing that the criminal justice
system acted once in the past to support her.20 5 Clearly, victims'
response can greatly affect how often police are called back or new
charges are brought. The police studies replicating the Minneapolis
experiment, however, like the original experiment itself, are flawed
by their failure to take victim response into account.
Also marring these police studies is the amalgamation of nu-
merous cases that may have far different dynamics that were lumped
together. Although women victimized by male partners comprise
ninety-four percent of domestic violence victims, 20 6 the Milwaukee
police study included all cases of domestic violence.20 7 While in no
way minimizing the seriousness of violence committed by a woman
against a man or by one homosexual or lesbian partner against the
other, we know so little about the dynamics of such cases that they
should have been either excluded or examined separately. 208 Simi-
larly, the minority of cases where women battered men should have
been excluded or examined separately. As David Adams, the direc-
tor of the country's first batterer's treatment program, testified
before the Gender Bias Study of the Court System in Massachusetts,
virtually every woman who was ever referred to his program was in
fact a victim wrongly accused by the batterer of being the aggres-
202 EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, BATrERED WOMEN, SELF DEFENSE AND
THE LAW 85 (1988).
203 Adele Harrell, Evaluation of Court Ordered Treatment for Domestic Violence Offenders: Fi-
nal Report 80, 92 (State Justice Institute, The Urban Institute, Oct. 1991).
204 Id. at 94.
205 GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 202, at 85.
206 BROWNE, supra note 45, at 8.
207 The Milwaukee study also included cases where the woman was seen as the aggres-
sor against a man or where the aggressor assaulted a partner of the same sex.
208 These cases were all eliminated in the Charlotte study.
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sor.20 9 The accused women who are actually victims should have
been excluded. Since we do not know whether the same factors mo-
tivate and deter those few women who are abusers, the female abus-
ers were also inappropriately included with the male batterers in the
Milwaukee study.
Furthermore, the experiments to replicate the Milwaukee police
data introduced some aspects that were almost certain to influence
the results by discouraging women from recontacting the police.
The Minneapolis experiment compared the effect of three police re-
sponses to domestic violence: arrest, advice, and sending the abuser
from the home for eight hours.2 10 The advice given by the police
officer was entirely left to the officer's discretion.211 In Charlotte
and Omaha the police actually asked the victim to leave the home in
forty percent and thirty-two percent of the cases respectively when
separation was the goal.
21 2
In Milwaukee, the three responses studied included arresting
abusers for the "usual" average of 11.1 hours (full arrest), arresting
abusers for only a short average of 2.8 hours (short arrest), and giv-
ing only a warning to the abuser.21 3 Each group was chosen at ran-
dom and heard a statement made by the officer. 2 14 The officers for
both arrest groups were instructed to state the following:
1. You are under arrest for battery.
2. Battery is a crime against the state.
3. We are pressing charges against you, not the victim (cuff suspect
before conveyance).
Only for those in the short arrest group were officers instructed to
add:
4. If you cooperate, you may be released in a few hours.2 15
Thus, some of the difference between the two groups might depend
upon the apparent empowerment given to offenders who were
promised a reward for cooperative behavior. In contrast, the warn-
ing was written so that both abusers and victims would receive the
same lecture:
209 See Sherman et al., supra note 193.
210 See Sherman & Berk, supra note 152, at 3.
211 Id.
212 HIRSCHEL ET AL., supra note 192, at 65; FRANKLYN W. DUNFORD ET AL., NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE OMAHA DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICE EXPERIMENT: FINAL RE-
PORT (1989). The Charlotte study eliminated all victims who wanted their abuser ar-
rested, and thus studied only cases involving women who were either ambivalent or
opposed to their partners being arrested.
213 Sherman et al., supra note 193, at 829.
214 Id. at 828.
215 Id. at 829 n.3.
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1. We're not going to arrest anyone here tonight.
2. If we have to return, someone will go to jail.
3. This is a list of people who can help you, both of you, with your
problem.
4. The D.A.'s office is on that list and you can contact them if you
want to press charges. 2
16
The warning, by failing to differentiate the abuser and the vic-
tim, or by failing to indicate that the police saw through the appar-
ent equal treatment, could have only a chilling effect on any victim.
This makes it far less likely that the women would ever call the po-
lice again or bring charges. Although the warning does clearly con-
vey that the police see the situation as serious and will arrest at least
one of the parties if they have to return, the neutral tone almost
surely made many victims fear that they might be arrested. Like-
wise, the invitation to the abuser to file charges against the victim
may have deterred many victims from either calling the police again
or bringing charges against the abuser. Even the statement that
they both have a problem and need help tended to disempower the
victim and make the victim feel more shame, blame and possibly
guilt. Of course, we do not know how the script was delivered. If
the officer looked sternly at the abuser while stating that one of the
parties would go to jail next time, the message could have been per-
ceived very differently from the way it would be perceived if the of-
ficer said the same thing while looking sternly at the victim.
Nonetheless, that such a dangerously inadequate message should
have formed the basis of the control group renders the results en-
tirely suspect.
Another weakness of these later studies was the experiment de-
sign. In some of the cities, the studies apparently called for subse-
quent police encounters to be treated as first encounters, with new
random assignment to one of the three groups. 21 7 That some abus-
ers, who were told to expect arrest the next time the police were
called, received only the same warning surely conveyed the message
that the warning was empty rhetoric. That some abusers who were
once arrested received only a warning a subsequent time (or possi-
bly a short-term arrest) makes it almost impossible to track the rea-
sons for their subsequent behavior. Victim response is again the
key.
Another troubling aspect was the large number of calls ex-
cluded from the Charlotte experiment. Only 686 of 591,664 calls
for domestic disturbance help were ultimately included, amounting
216 Id. at 829 n.3.
217 Id. at 828.
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to only .1 16% of the calls received (or .128% of the calls where an
officer was dispatched). 21 8 All cases where the women requested
that the abuser be arrested were inexplicably excluded.21 9 Thus, the
only cases studied were those few ones in which the woman was
either ambivalent about or opposed to having her abuser arrested.
An equally disturbing feature of the Charlotte study was the as-
sumption that women victims who were not interviewed were as-
sumed not to have been victims of subsequent crimes. 220 This
assumption is especially suspect given the large discrepancy in un-
completed follow-ups in victim interviews between cases where an
arrest was made or a citation issued and cases where advice and sep-
aration were used.221 In most of the cases that lacked follow-up in-
terviews, the women could not be located. 222 In a few, they were
afraid to cooperate. 223 In cases where their abusers were given cita-
tions or arrested on the spot, only 13.3% and 13.6% of the women,
respectively, failed to complete the six-month follow-up inter-
view.22 4 Yet 20.4% of the women (150% more than in the other
groups) whose cases were mediated and who were temporarily sepa-
rated from their abusers did not complete the six-month
interview. 22
5
We also need to know how many victims and abusers heard
about other police responses to domestic disturbances. The twenty-
four percent of abusers and nineteen percent of victims who knew
about Milwaukee's mandatory arrest policy 2 26 should have been ex-
cluded from the study, particularly if no arrest was made. Others
who learned of other possible police responses also should have
been excluded. An inherent weakness in this experiment was the
assumption that abusers would expect police to respond in the same
way the next time.
It would be helpful to know in all of these studies whether and
for how long the parties separated and whether and where any of
them moved. Did the victim's behavior vary with the police re-
sponse? If one or both of the parties (and especially the victim)
moved out of the city, the abuser would be less likely to show up
again in the city's police and court records, at least as repeating his
218 HIRSCHEL ET AL., supra note 192, at 28.
219 id. at 26.
220 Id. at 120.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 92.
223 Id. at 83.
224 Id. at 84.
225 Id. at 82-92.
226 Sherman et al., supra note 193, at 845.
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violence against the same victim. Rather than asking abusers if they
knew that the city had a mandatory arrest policy, it would have been
more helpful to ask what policy they thought the police had. If it
included arrest, then on what basis? Learning what the abuser be-
lieved to be the outcome of his actions might better explain his
motivations in the first place. Someone who believes that arrest is
an unlikely possibility will probably assess that risk very differently
from someone who believes that arrest is a certainty.
That the prosecution outcome was not seriously monitored or
examined in the replication experiments is also distressing. Bat-
tered women's advocates expect that an arrest, followed by a speedy
trial with a real sentence whose terms are enforced, sends the
strongest message. The message communicated when a person is
arrested, but never prosecuted (as happened to ninety-five percent
of those arrested in the Milwaukee experiment)227 might so weaken
any long-term deterrent effect of the arrest as to explain the results.
The same could be true of a low conviction rate (only one percent
were convicted in Milwaukee 228) and lenient or unenforced
sentences (only 0.9% in Charlotte spent time in prison after sen-
tencing)229 or enforced.
We also need to explore the manner in which different arrest,
prosecution and sentencing policies affect the children in homes
where there is domestic violence. Even if it turned out that an arrest
policy has no effect on either the offender or the victim, if it has a
deterrent effect on the sons, the policy might still be worthwhile,
because they are at danger of growing up to be abusers them-
selves. 230 Similarly, if fewer daughters who grow up in homes where
they see their abused mothers stay in abusive relationships as adults,
the deterrence would be a success. Yet, society is unlikely to know
any of this for many years.
We should not forget the results of the Duluth experiment,231
which studied different police policies. That study revealed that mi-
nority males comprised thirty-three percent of those arrested when
arrest was encouraged but left completely to officers' discretion,
thirteen percent of those arrested when officers were encouraged to
arrest and required to submit written reports explaining failures to
do so, but only 8.5% of those arrested under a policy mandating
227 Id. at 822.
228 Id.
229 HIRSCHEL ET AL., supra note 192, at 147.
230 WALLERSTEIN & BLACKSLEE, supra note 8, at 121.
231 Caroline Forell, Stopping the Violence: Mandatory Arrest and Police Tort Liability for Fail-
ure to Assist Battered Wonmen, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 215, 221 (1991).
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arrest.23 2 Thus, the more discretion officers had, the more they ar-
rested individuals whom the Milwaukee experiment found were less
likely to be deterred. 233 Importantly, when police officers are given
wide discretion, they frequently use that discretion to not arrest
those abusers who would most likely be deterred by arrest. 23 4
It should also be remembered that advocates of battered wo-
men should be involved in designing any domestic violence experi-
ments. That family counseling and mediation, both of which are
known to increase domestic violence and thus to be contraindicated
in cases of domestic violence, 235 were included in the police replica-
tion experiments flaws the results. The same is true for the Milwau-
kee warnings suggesting that the victim risked being arrested.23 6
Likewise, the victim-blaming tactic that presumptively assumed that
the victim should leave the home could only have increased some
victims' guilt and self-blame, making them less likely to call the po-
lice in the future. Just because a police tactic successfully deters fu-
ture calls to police does not mean that it did so by successfully
deterring future criminal behavior.
At any rate, it seems problematic to single out domestic vio-
lence as the focus of a study whether arrest has any deterrent effect
on offenders, since domestic violence crimes have been trivialized, if
not ignored, for so long. Although advocates of battered women
welcome the opportunity to learn what stops criminal behavior, we
remain somewhat skeptical when so much of the research seems in-
tent on returning to the old do-nothing or even blame-the-victim
practices.
232 Id.
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